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11. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
The instant case is a claim for relief brought by the appellant (plaintiff below) to 
recover for injuries sustained by the appellant while on the premises of the respondents 
(defendants below). 
This area of the law is usually labeled as "premises liability." This is an area of the 
law where legal distinctions and limitations are drawn based upon the status of the person 
coming on the premises of another. However, the usual elements of negligence such as 
proof of breach, actual cause and legal cause are all applicable once the appropriate duty has 
been "found." 
In the instant case the appellant (plaintiff below) had the status (at the time of the 
event) of being a licensee inasmuch as she was a social guest of the respondents at the time 
of the event in question. 
B. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This instant case was initiated by the appellant filing a Verified Complaint and 
Demand for Jury Trial on February 1,2006. (R. p. 6). The complaint generally alleges a 
negligent failure to warn on the part of the respondents in failing to warn the appellant of the 
dangers and unsafe conditions existing on and in their premises and a failure to maintain 
their premises in a safe and reasonable manner together with an allegation that one of the 
respondents was negligent in her negligent attempt to "set" the right arm in the shoulder 
socket of the appellant after the appellant sustained a dislocated shoulder. The verified c 
complaint also sets forth a claim of negligent design of the respondents' premises including 
the negligent placement of a rug on a tile floor within the premises. The complaint set forth 
the injuries sustained by the appellant as a result of the fall that she sustained while in and on 
the respondents' premises. The complaint of the appellant was answered by the defendants 
on or about July 27,2006. (R., page 14). 
The respondents moved the trial court to exclude the expert testimony of the 
appellant's biomechanical expert, Matthew Meacham. The court entered a Memorandum 
Opinion and Order granting in part, denying in part, the defendants' Motion to Exclude 
Expert Witness on or about May 18,2007. (R. p. 20). The court concluded that the 
plaintiffs expert, Matthew Meacham, could not testify that the bathroom created a 
dangerous condition and offered as rationale for this conclusion "that the probity value of 
Mecharn's conclusion as to the dangerousness of the bathroom is outweighed by its 
prejudicial effect". . . and that thee ultimate conclusion that Mecham draws does not aid the 
trier of fact to understand the evidence." (R. p. 25). 
The court ruled that the expert witness, Matthew Mecham, could provide to the jury 
the scientific data he had collected; his measurements, the photographs taken, and his 
examination of the rug and its backing and "any testimony relating to the flooring conditions 
and their effect upon the rug." But, "the ultimate conclusion, however, is squarely within 
the competence of the average juror." (R. p. 25). This ruling of the court resulted in the 
final investigative report of Matthew Meacham being modified. The modification was the 
excision from Matthew Mecham's report that the bathroom and the bathroom rug of the 
respondents constituted a dangerous and hazardous condition. (R. p. 34, Exhibit K). The 
other result of this ruling by the court was that Matthew Meacham did not testify to the jury 
as to the hazardous and dangerous condition of the bathroom and of the bathroom rug at 
time of trial. (See Tr. pp. 61-79). 
The appellant did make an offer of proof of Matthew Meacham's intended testimony 
to the court. (Tr. pp. 61-78). This offer of proof was refused by the court. (Tr. pp. 77-78). 
It should be noted that the initial attempt at trial was thwarted by a mistrial occurring 
based upon the inappropriate introduction into voir dire of the question of insurance 
coverage. The respondents' attorney moved for a mistrial which motion was granted by the 
court. (R. p. 32). 
The second attempt at trial was on August 8,2007. As noted in the Minute Entry, the 
trial proceeded from August 8 to August 10,2007. The jury returned a verdict (on special 
verdict) including that the respondents (defendants below) were not negligent, or if 
negligent, that their negligence was not the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. (R. p. 
37). The court then entered a judgment on special verdict dated August 10,2007. (R. p. 40). 
The appellant then filed a Notice of Appeal on September 20,2007, and later filed an 
amended Notice oEAppea1. (R. pp. 53-57). 
C. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
At the time of the incident, the appellant (hereinafter Kay) was fifry-three (53) years 
of age, (Tr., p. 109,ll. 23-25), and was a longtime resident of Idaho Falls, Idaho. (Tr., p. 
108,ll. 19-23). She was a registered nurse (Tr., p. 110,ll. 1-2) and had been for eighteen 
years. (Tr., p. l l0,l l .  3-5). 
Kay entered the residence of the respondents (hereinafter, Vondel and Beclcy) on 
March 19,2005. Vondel and Becky's residence is located in Firth, Idaho. (Tr,, p. 112,ll. 
15-18; 1.20). Kay had been invited to the premises by reason of a surprise birthday party 
which was to be given for a mutual friend, Chad Williams. (Tr., p. 112,ll. 21-25). Previous 
to the party, Kay had received a written invitation and had also received oral notice of the 
surprise birthday party. ( T .  p.113 1 1  19) .  Kay had read the written invitation to the 
surprise birthday party for Chad Williams. The written invitation had specifically instructed 
that this was a "bring your own bottle" party, and if necessary, the invitees should bring 
sleeping bags, blankets and pillows for a "sleep over" if you were not able to drive home 
safely. (Tr., p. 113,ll. 15-20) 
In preparation for the surprise birthday party, Kay procured a pedicure and a 
manicure, and had bought fruit for a "fruit bowl" to take to the surprise birthday party. (Tr., 
p. 114,ll. 5-17). Prior to leaving for the surprise birthday party, Kay had visited with a 
family friend, Greg Mickelsen, at her home. (Tr., p. 1 16,1. 18 - p. 1 17,l. 10). Mr. 
Mickelsen testified that Kay was not under the influence of alcohol before she went to the 
birthday party. (Tr., p. 227,ll. 1-9). 
For the occasion, Kay had selected some shoes that had three inch heels. Kay had 
worn the shoes before and had no problem wearing them and testified that the shoes were not 
"unstable." (Tr., p. 117,ll. 23-24 - p. 118,l. 6). 
Kay arrived at Vondel and Becky's residence at approximately 4:15 p.m.-4:20 p.m. 
(Tr., p. 1 1 8  Vondel saw and observed Kay arrive at his house. (Tr., p. 119,ll. 19-24). Kay 
denies drinking prior to coming to the party. (Tr., p. 121,ll. 7-1 1). While at the party, Kay d 
did have "two or three swallows of an alcoholic drink", (Tr., p. 121,l. 15 - p. 122,l. 7) and 
observed at least three other people drinking at the party. (Tr., p. 123,ll. 19-22). 
Kay then found it necessary to locate a bathroom. Kay cannot remember having 
entered this bathroom before March 19,2005, the date of the event (Tr., p. 124,l. 25 - p. 125, 
1. 2) and noted that it was the "most unusual bathroom I've ever seen." (Tr., p. 179,l. 24 - p. 
180,l.l). It was necessary for Kay to be directed to the bathroom by Becky. (Tr., p. 125,11. 
3-1 1). Before Kay entered the bathroom, Becky did not supply any instructions or warnings 
regarding the bathroom. (Tr., p. 125,ll. 12-18). Specifically, Becky did not say anything 
about the new rug that had been placed in the bathroom for the party. (Tr., p. 125,ll. 19-23). 
Becky did not tell or instruct Kay how to use the bathroom. (Tr., p. 125,l. 24 - p. 126,l. 1). 
Kay testified to the jury that upon entering the bathroom her attention was on the toilet 
and nothing else. (Tr., p. 126,ll. 15-21). Kay testified that she did what she would normally 
do in this situation and did nothing wrong. (Tr., p. 1 2 7 ,  1-21). Kay testified upon cross- 
examination that she did not notice the rug and did not know whether the rug was attached to 
the floor or not attached to the floor and did not know anything about the backing on the rug. 
(Tr., p. 151,ll. 13-22). Kay assumed that she was safe in the bathroom. (Tr., p. 189,ll. 1-3). 
Kay stated at the time of her trial testimony that she would have been more cautious if she 
had known about the situation of the slick floor and the rug, (Tr., p. 188) and noted that the 
rug slid out from under her and that she was then pitched forward into the recessed shower. 
(Tr., pp. 176-177). 
Kay did not know of the recessed shower until using the facilities and directly facing 
the recessed shower. (Tr., p. 191,ll. 7-9) (See also Tr., p. 152,ll. 6-9). 
As a result of the rug slipping out from under her and her pitching forward, Kay fell 
into the recessed shower and struck her body which resulted in severe and painful injuries, 
most notably to her right shoulder. ( T .  p. 13511 1 4 )  A couple of days after the event, 
photographs were taken by Mr. Mickelsen of Kay which depicted the injuries that she had 
sustained in Vondel and Becky's residence. (See Exhibit C; Tr. p. 137,ll. 10-13). The 
injuries also included bruising and abrasions to her knees, legs and right wrist. (See Tr., pp. 
138-139). The shoulder injuries resulting from the fall required surgery by an orthopedic 
surgeon at Mountain View Hospital on March 30,2005. (Tr., p. 140,ll. 6-19). Kay 
underwent physical therapy for a period of eleven weeks as a result of the injuries she 
sustained and the subsequent surgery and was unable to work for a period of nine to eleven 
weeks. (Tr., p. 141, 11. 10-15 - p. 144,ll. 9-1 1). Kay required help in her daily routine for six 
( 6 )  weeks after the fall into the shower (Tr., p. 150 - p. 151). Kay's medical expenses were 
$21,425.93 as a result of her fall into the shower (Supplemental R. P. 54). Prior to her fall 
into the recessed shower, Kay had not sustained any previous injury to her right arm or 
shoulder. (Tr., p. 15 1,ll. 9-10). 
At trial, Kay's expert witness, Matthew Mecham, testified that he was a forensic 
engineer that specialized in accident reconstruction and biomechanical evaluations. (Tr., p. 
25,ll. 10-13). Mr. Mecham has also had extensive experience in shoulder and knee injuries, 
(Tr., p. 26,ll. 6-21). Mr. Mecham testified as to his extensive educational background and 
credentials, (Tr., p. 26-30) which qualified him to testify in the instant case. Some of Mr. 
Mecham's credentials that especially qualified him to testify in Kay's trial were being an 
accredited accident reconstructionist, a certified medical investigator and his background and 
abilities in safety inspections and evaluations particularly in slip and fall and trip and fall 
analysis. (Tr., pp. 28-30). Mr. Mecham reviewed with the jury the information and data that 
he relied upon in giving his testimony and opinions. These included interrogatories, request 
for productions, deposition transcripts of the principals, and his actual visit to the accident 
location where he took measurements and photographs. (Tr., pp. 34-36). 
Based upon Mr. Mecham's examination of the premises, he established that there was 
no shower door in the bathroom, that the distance from the lip of the toilet to the recessed 
shower was 24 inches. (Tr., p. 35). Mr. Mecham also established that the distance from the 
toilet floor level to the bottom of the shower recess was 14 inches. (Tr., pp. 43-46). 
In re-creating the conditions at the time of the event, Mr. Mecham opined that when 
Kay was seated on the toilet, it was approximately 8 - 8 114 inches from the tip of Kay's 
shoe to the drop-off into the shower. (Tr., p. 44,ll. 15-19). Mr. Mecham noted that there was 
no barrier or edge protection between the toilet area and the shower area. (Tr., p, 46,ll. 1- 
12). Mr. Mecham noted upon cross-examination that Kay's position that lead to the fall, or 
drop off into the recessed shower, could not have been replicated if there had been a door or a 
wall between the toilet area and the recessed shower. (Tr., p. 83). 
Critically, Mr. Mecham observed and opined that a person upon entering the bathroom 
would not be aware of the recessed shower area. (Tr., p. 47,ll. 10-15; p. 103,11. 16-19). 
Mr. Mecham observed that there was tile in the toilet area (Tr., p. 47,l. 20) and 
established that the rug that he examined was the same rug; that was on the bathroom floor on 
March 19,2005, and had been inspected by Mr. Mecham previously. (Tr., p. 48,ll. 10-15) 
Mr. Mecham stated to the jury that the rug would increase the probability of a fall, and 
that this rug did contribute to the fall in this instance. (Tr., pp. 49 - 50,l. 16). 
Mr. Meacham's observations of the rug indicated to him that the rug was light weight 
and that the backing of the rug was of a nylon type, and it was not a non-slip backing. Mr. 
Meacham also observed that the rug was not attached to the floor. (See Tr., p. 49,l. 17 - p. 
50, 1. 19). The rug's fiber itself was 2 inches in length and would be of the type that would 
wrap around shoes and become snagged on a part of the clothing. (Tr., p. 50,l. 22 - p. 51,ll. 
5-10). 
Mr. Mecham observed and opined that the shoes that were worn by Kay on the day of 
the event were not defective and did not increase the potential for the fall. (Tr., p. 52,ll. 23 - 
p. 53,l. 1). 
Mr. Mecham opined that the contributing factors to the fall were as follows: 
1. A sudden drop-off; 
2. The rug; 
3. There was no edge protection; nothing to stop a person from pitching forward; and 
4. The close proximity of the drop-off and the toilet. (See Tr., p. 53,ll. 2-9). 
Mr. Mecham told the jury that the solution to fix the bathroom was to either fill in the 
shower or run a wall or door between the toilet and the shower area. (Tr., p. 54,Il. 10-23). 
The monies that would be needed to cure or remedy the defective condition of the bathroom 
would be in the area of $500. (Tr., p. 55,11.1-12). 
Mr. Mecham stated to the jury that Kay's injuries were consistent with Kay's 
explanation of the fall (Tr., p. 57 - 58) and that the photographs taken of Kay two days after 
the fall collaborated this conclusion. (See Exhibit C). 
Mr. Mecham testified that if the area that Kay had fallen onto (or into) had been level, 
her injuries would have been less severe. (Tr., p. 60,11.17-24). Mr. Mecham stated that all of 
his opinions were, to a reasonable degree, of scientific and biomechanical probability. (Tr., 
After Mr. Mecham delivered his testimony that conformed to the boundaries 
established by the court's pre-trial order excluding portions of his opinions, the plaintiff made 
an offer of proof that the bathroom configuration, the bathroom floor and the bathroom rug, 
were a significant factor in Kay's fall and that these items formed a hazardous condition "that 
was a proximate or contributing factor to the cause of her fall and the severity of Kay 
Chapman's injuries." (This offer of proof is found in the transcript at pages 61-63.) Mr. 
Mecham stated that these opinions were based upon a reasonable degree of scientific and 
biomechanical probability. ( T .  p. 6 1 8-11). The court refused this offer. (Tr., p. 77-78). 
D. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS ON APPEAL 
As noted in the course of proceedings below, the appellant (Kay) filed a Notice of 
Appeal and an Amended Appeal from the jury's and the lower court's verdict and order on 
verdict. 
111. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. DID THE COURT ERR IN EXCLUDING MATTHEW MECHAM'S OFFER 
OF PROOF ? 
B. DID THE COURT ERR IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY WITH 
PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED INSTRUCTIONS NUMBERED l8,20 AND 24 ? 
C. DID THE COURT ERR IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY WITH 
PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED INSTRUCTIONS NUMBERED 14 AND 15? 
D. WAS THE JURY VERDICT CONSISTENT WITH THE EVIDENCE 
PRESENTED AT TIME OF TRIAL ? 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. THE COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING THE EXPERT WITNESS CONCLUSION 
OF MATTHEW MECHAM. 
As indicated, supra, Matthew Mecham was qualified as an expert in the areas of 
forensic engineering and of biomechanical engineering. Matthew Mecham, by reason of his 
credentials, his inspection of the bathroom, and of the rug, was competent to testify in this 
matter in regard to accident reconstruction and to biomechanical evaluations including safety 
inspections. (See Tr., pp. 23-30). Mr. Mecham coinplied with Rule 703 of the Idaho Rules of 
Evidence in that the facts or data upon which he relied in order to render opinions were 
exhaustively explained by Mr. Mecham. (See Tr., pp. 39-45). It can be fairly concluded that 
from a review of the Trial Transcript that there was no objection to the knowledge, 
experience or expertise of Mr. Mecham in these identified areas. 
The standard of review for this court in deciding this issue is whether the trial court 
abused his discretion in excluding Mr. Mecham's testimony. See e.g., Kolln v. St. Luke's 
Regional Medical Center, 130 Idaho 323,327; 940 P.2d 1142, 1146, (Idaho 1997). 
What were the opinions that were excluded by the court? The opinions as to the 
bathroom configuration, the bathroom floor and the bathroom rug, were, as delivered by Mr. 
Mecham during his offer of proof as follows: 
My opinion is that it was a hazardous condition, and it did - it was a proximate 
or contributing factor to the cause of her fall. 
(Tr., p. 62, 11. 19-21). 
Further, Mr. Mecham refined that opinion in stating: 
I believe that it did pose a danger and a hazard, and it was a contributing factor 
to not only the fall, but the severity of Kay Chapman's injuries. (Tr., p. 63,11. 
5-7). 
Mr. Mecham also posited that his opinions were based upon a reasonable degree of 
scientific and biomechanical probability. ( T .  p. 6 I .  - 1  1 )  The exclusion of Mr. 
Mecham's testimony as outlined, supra, was fatal to the Kay's case at the time of trial. There 
are multiple reasons upon which this statement may be made. A review of the jury 
instructions that were given or refused would emphasize the glaring absence of the opinion 
of the case expert. 
For example, Plaintiff's Requested Instruction No. 12 and the Court's Instruction No. 
13 stated to the jury the following: 
A witness who has special knowledge in a particular matter may give his 
opinion on that matter. In determining the weight to be given such an opinion, 
you should consider the qualifications and credibility of the witness and the 
reasons given for his opinion. You are not bound by such opinion. Give it the 
weight, if any, to which you deem it entitled. 
The instruction cautions the jury that they are not bound by "such opinion." This 
would blunt any prejudice. If the jury disagreed with Mr. Mecham, they are advised that 
they have the right to do so. 
There was only one expert that testified at the time of trial. Opposing counsel argued 
the fact that Kay's expert did not conclude that the bathroom was dangerous or hazardous. 
You therefore have the situation where the court excludes "the ultimate conclusion" that the 
bathroom is dangerous and then allows the opposing counsel to comment to the jury that 
there must be some glaring problem with Kay's case in as much as her own expert did not 
conclude that the bathroom was dangerous or hazardous. 
The court's instructions numbered 10,22,23 and 24 "speak" in terms of unreasonable 
risks of harm, dangerous or defective conditions or of dangerous or existing hazards. Not to 
allow the single qualified expert, and the linch pin of Kay's case, to testify in regard to these 
very conditions that must be found by the jury, was a mortal blow to Kay's case. The judge 
advised the jury that they must conclude that these conditions exist for Kay to prevail but 
then prohibits Kay's expert from testifying to the jury that these conditions, based upon his 
expertise, knowledge and experience, do exist and did exist on March 19,2005. 
The rules of evidence that exist in Idaho would not prohibit or exclude the testimony 
of Mr. Mecham. Rule 702 states as follows: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of 
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, 
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. (Rule 702, IRE). 
Rule 704 also does away with the archaic prohibition in regard to rendering an 
opinion on the ultimate fact or issue of a case. Rule 704 states as follows: 
Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not 
objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier 
of fact. (Rule 704, IRE). 
On the "liberal change" as evidenced by the promulgation of Rules 702 and 704, a 
commentator has stated thusly: 
This change in viewpoint concerning "ultimate fact" opinion resulted from the 
realization that the rule excluding opinion on ultimate facts is unduly 
restrictive, and can pose many close questions of application. The rule can 
unfairly obstruct the presentation of a party's case. to say nothing of the 
illogic of the notion that opinions on ultimate facts usum the iurv's function. 
In jurisdictions where the traditional prohibition survives, there can be time- 
consuming arguments over whether an opinion concerns an ultimate fact. 
1 McCormick on Evidence, $12 (6 Ed.) (See FN 16) (emphasis added). 
As to the trial court's decision that the opinions that were being offered by Mr. 
Mecham were in the common province of the jury, the following extracts from treatises and 
from cases cast light on the purposes and philosophies of Rule 702 and Rule 704. In Carroll 
v. Otis Elevator Company, 896 F.2d 210, 21 1 (7th Circuit 1999), in an action for personal 
injuries arising out of a fall on an escalator after an unidentified child pushed a red 
emergency stop button, the trial court acted within its discretion to permit the plaintiffs 
expert psychologist to testify that the button's color made it more attractive to children; it 
was stated: 
While it is true that one needn't be B. F. Skinner to know that brightly colored 
objects are attractive to small children, and that covered buttons or those with 
significant resistance are more difficult to actuate by little hands, given our 
liberal federal standard, the trial court was not 'manifestly erroneous' in 
admitting this testimony. 
Or, as stated by Wigmore: 
The true test of the admissibility of such testimony is not whether the subject 
matter is common or uncommon, or whether many persons or few have some 
knowledge of the matter; but it is whether the witnesses offered as experts 
have any peculiar knowledge or experience llot common to the world, which 
renders their opinions founded on such knowledge or experience any aid to the 
court or the jury in determining the questions at issue. 7 Wigmore Evidence, 
ChadbournRev., (1978) $ 1923, pp. 31-32. 
In Kovf v. S k ~ r m ,  993 F.2d 374,377 (4"' Cir 1993) a civil rights actions 
arising out of alleged improper use of force by police, the trial court erred in 
precluding experts who were testifying that defendants' actions were brutal 
and excessive. The appellant court stated: 
The subject matter of Rule 702 testimony need not be arcane or even 
especially difficult to comprehend. If, again in the disjunctive, the proposed 
testimony will recount or employ "scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge, it is a proper subject. There is no gap between the "specialized 
knowledge" that is admissible under the rule and the "common knowledge" 
that is not. The boundary between the two is defined by helpfulness. 
The authors of Federal Practice and Procedure have observed: 
Expert testimony is often received on the subject of causation, Thus, courts 
commonly admit expert testimony based on the evaluation of physical 
evidence at an accident scene to determine the likely cause of death or injury. 
Similarly, courts have permitted experts to testify as to whether a product or 
piece of machinery involved in an accident was the cause of that accident or 
had a design defect that rendered it unsafe. Federal Practice and Procedure, 29 
Fed. Prac. & Proc., 5 6264 (2007) (See FN 60). 
It appears that the trial judge concluded that since the jury with their collective 
common sense could determine whether the bathroom configuration in conjunction with the 
slick tile floor and the rug constituted a hazard or dangerous condition that the expert opinion 
of Mr. Mecham was not helpful or would not assist the jury. This conclusion frustrated Ray 
in her efforts to meet the burden of proof provided to the jury in the court's instructions. 
This error was compounded by the court's refusal to allow the jury a view of the premises as 
established by the court's refusal to give the plaintiff's requested Instructions numbered 10 
and 1 1. (Supplemental Record, pp. 13-14). 
To recapitulate: the court gave instructions directing the jury to determine whether 
there was a dangerous or hazardous condition existing on Vondel and Becky's premise, and 
yet, the court removed from Kay's case the exact testimony that met that burden from a 
qualified source, Matthew Mecham. As already stated, the court compounded the problem 
by allowing the defense attorney to comment on the absence of these opinions from Kay's 
expert and refused the jury the opportunity to exercise its collective "common sense" and 
observe first-hand the bizarre configuration and physical surroundings that gave birth to the 
complaint of injury. I11 the end, the trial judge sacrificed admissibility for some misplaced 
fixation (worship) of a nonexistent prejudice. Mr. Mecham's opinion was unequivocal 
evidence on an essential element of Kay's case. 
Another way to state or to clarify the error committed by the trial court is that the 
evidence proffered by Mr. Mecham would have assisted or helped the jury understand the 
evidence of his observations; his measurements of distances and depths; his testimony of 
Kay's positions before and at the time of the fall; and his evidence of how to rectify or fix the 
dangerous or hazardous condition. (See Court's Instruction No. 23: The owner owes a duty to 
fix or warn of any dangerous or defective condition known to the owner, or which. in the 
exercise of ordinarv care should have been discovered.) (emphasis supplied) (Supplemental 
Record, p. 64). While it is true that some jurors may have fathomed the interplay of the 
distances and depths expressed by Mr. Mecham's measurements, and his observations 
regarding the tile floor and the rug through his photographs, they may not have been able to 
put together the ultimate conclusions of danger and the fact that the defendants should have 
discovered it. 
In the absence of Mr. Mecham's prohibited testimony and in the absence of the jury's 
ability to view the bathroom scene, this is the most probable determination. To paraphrase 
one of the quoted cases, cited supra, one may not have to be a biomechanical engineer to 
understand the danger or hazard posed by the tile floor, the rug and the distances and depths 
expressed by Mr. Mecham; but certainly, it would have been helpful to the jury, and less 
confusing to the jury, to allow Mr. Mecham to testify (based upon his review and inspection 
and based upon all of those measurements and photographs and upon his knowledge, 
experience and expertise) that the bathroom and rug did pose a danger or hazard. This 
information would have been "helpful" to the jury by having someone tie together the 
inspections, the measurements, conclusions and photographs. This point is especially 
important in as much as the introduction of the rug without a rubber backing (non-slip) was 
introduced into the factual and legal scenario by Vondel and Becky on the day of the 
incident. (When was it reasonable for the defendants to discover the hazard or the danger?) 
The absence of Mr. Mecham's opinion is especially troublesotne given two factors at 
trial that were evidently missed by the trial court. The first is that Mr. Mecham, as 
previously explored, testified that a person, upon entering the bathroom would not be aware 
of the recessed shower area. (See Tr., pp. 47, and 103). (The Court: Well, I didn't see - I 
didn't hear him testify to that.) (Tr., p. 79.11.10-1 1). This point was emphasized by Kay in 
her testimony as already explored, supra. (See Tr., pp. 126, 152 and 191). The other factor 
is the underlying inference from the defendants through testimony that son~ehow Kay was 
responsible for the fall, either by her actions, inaction or by her drinking prior to going into 
the bathroom. Mr. Mecham's testimony would have made it crystal clear to the jury that 
regardless of drink, and to a large part, regardless of the mechanics employed by someone 
using the toilet, this bathroom was a hazard and a dangerous condition, and most importantly, 
the physical facts that existed at the time and place of Kay's event were a hazard and a 
danger to her. This excluded testimony would have highlighted and emphasized the 
negligence of Vondel and Becky in failing to warn Kay, failing to give Kay instructions, and 
failing to point out or warn of the new rug and a caution to her in regard to using the toilet in 
the bathroom. 
It is respectfully submitted that the exclusion by the court of Mr. ~ e c h a h ' s  testimony 
was manifest and reversible error in this case. 
B. THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING THE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTIONS NUMBERED 18,20, AND 24. 
As part of the Plaintiff's Requested Jury Instructions, the plaintiff included IDJI 
Instructions 3.17 (Supplemental Record, p. 21), IDJI No. 3.1 1 and IDJI No. 3.01. 
(Supplemental Record, pp. 2 1,23 and 27). 
The standard on review of whether a jury instruction should or should not have been 
given is whether there is evidence at trial to support the instruction. Holzheimer v. 
Johannesen, 125 Idaho 397,401; 871 P.2d 814,818 (Idaho 1994); See also, Watson v. 
Navistar International Transportation Corporation, 121 Idaho 643,666, 827 P.2d 656,679 
(Idaho 1992). 
In the instant case, the standard enunciated by Holzheimer v. Johannesen, cited supra, 
was met at trial. 
In the instant case, the landowners, Vondel and Becky knew of the proximity of the 
toilet to the recessed shower area. (See Tr., p. 304). Becky was in possession of knowledge 
that she had purchased a new rug probably within a day or two of the party, and that the rug 
did not have anti-slip backing. Becky anticipated that the guests would be drinking and that 
she might have overnight guests. (Tr., pp. 202-203). Vondel and Becky also knew that 
previously at least one person, Grant Reed, had fallen in the bathroom. (Tr., p. 210). Becky 
was aware that Kay was entering the bathroom to use the bathroom's toilet. (Tr., p. 204). 
Becky never cautioned Kay about the bathroom. (Tr., p. 204). Kay was never advised about 
the drop-off in the bathroom. (Tr., p. 204). Kay was never cautioned about the new rug 
without the anti-slip backing that was in the bathroom. (Tr., p. 205). There is no question 
that after the event that Becky found Kay in the bottom of the recessed shower area and 
attempted to reset Kay's shoulder. (Tr., pp. 207-209). According to Kay, Becky specifically 
directed Kay to the bathroom in question. (Tr., p. 125). 
Given this factual foundation, the court had a basis and should have instructed the 
jury in regard to IDJI No. 3.17. (Once an owner discovers a visitor of anv status proceeding 
on a course, which probably will result in harm because of a dangerous condition of the 
premises, which is known to the owner but not known to the visitor, the owner owes a duty to 
use reasonable means to warn the visitor of the dangerous condition. The failure to do so 
amounts to reckless conduct). (emphasis supplied) At least one of the landowners, Becky, 
knew that Kay had had some consumed alcohol and was about to enter an area which posed a 
danger to her visitor. Beclcy had a duty to warn Kay as to the potential dangerous condition 
confronting Kay within the bathroom. This is evidenced by Becky's spontaneous declaration 
to Kay while driving to the hospital that "you probably slipped on that damn rug." And those 
were her exact words. (Tr., p. 132,ll. 2-3). 
To recapitulate: Vondel and Becky knew the configuration of the bathroom. The 
bathroom had not changed since the time of its construction from 1962-1963. (Tr., p. 197). 
Kay had testified that she was unfamiliar with this particular bathroom. The purchase of the 
rug introduced a "new" factor to the bathroom for the purpose of the birthday party. Both 
Kay and Becky agreed that no warning with regard to bathroom, its configuration or the fact 
of the new rug on the tile floor was communicated to Kay by Becky. Both Kay and Becky 
agree that Kay had had some alcoholic intake prior to her use of the bathroom. It would 
appear that all of the elements of the instruction have an evidentiary base and the requested 
jury instructions should have been given by the court. 
The same can be said for IDJI No. 3.1 1. (Plaintiffs Requested Instruction No. 20) 
(Supplemental Record, p. 23). (The owner owes a duty to exercise ordinary care in the 
inspection of the premises for the purpose of discovering dangerous conditions.) In the 
instant case, Vondel and Becky were having a birthday party with numerous invited guests. 
There is no question that "drinking" was to take place at the time and the place of the party. 
Given the bizarre configuration of the bathroom and the introduction into that bathroom of a 
new rug on a tile floor that did not have an anti-slip backing, it was incumbent upon Vondel 
and Becky to conduct an inspection of the bathroom for the safeguarding of their invited 
guests. Contrast this instruction to Vondel's approach to safely: (1) Not aware of the rug 
(Tr., p. 292) and (2) not caring about the presence of the rug (Tr., p. 293). This is evidenced 
by Becky's admission that after the party there was a joke in regard to this bathroom that you 
should enter at your own risk, (Tr., p. 213) and her statement cited supra regarding Kay 
slipping on the rug. 
The rationale in regard to the rug is expressed in the following cases. For example, in 
Patterson v. Thomas, 118 Ga. App. 326; 163 S.E.2d 331 (Ga. Ct App. 1968) it was stated: 
The evidence fails to establish that there were no genuine issues for 
consideration by the jury, whether the defendant knew or should have realized 
that the rug placed on the slippery floor created an unreasonable risk of harm 
to the plaintiff as a social guest, and should have expected that the plaintiff 
would not realize the danger, and whether the plaintiff had reason to know of 
the danger. We cannot say as a matter of law, therefore, that the evidence 
shows that there was no breach of the defendant's duty to the plaintiff as a 
social guest. The trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for 
summary judgment. 
It is of interest that in Patterson v. Thomas, the Restatement of Law of Torts (2d) 5 
342 was cited by the court to outline the duty of the landowner to the licensee. Idaho, in its 
case law, has adopted this same standard to outline the duty of a landowner to a licensee. 
Evans v. Park, 1 I2 Idaho 400,401,732 P.2d 369,370 (Idaho App. 1987). 
Based upon the foregoing it is Kay's contention that IDJI No. 3.01 (Supplemental 
Record, p. 27) (an owner owes a duty not to cause intentional or reckless harm to persons or 
property on the premises) should have been given to the jury. The basis for this contention is 
found in IDJI No. 3.17. As illustrated, supra, there was an evidentiary basis upon which to 
allow the instruction of IDJI No. 3.17 to the jury. IDJI No. 3.17 clearly states that if there 
has been a breach of the duty owed that "the failure to do so amounts to reckless conduct." 
Given that IDJI No. 3.17 should have been placed with the jury, IDJI No. 3.01 should have 
been given in as much as the failure to warn under the circumstance allowed under IDJI No. 
3.17 would be the basis to conclude that Vondel and Becky's conduct was "reckless" in 
regard to Kay. 
Based upon the foregoing, it is respectfully forwarded to this court that the court erred 
in its failure to instruct the jury on Plaintiffs Requested Jury Instructions Nos. 18,20 and 24. 
C. THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY PURSUANT 
TO PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS NUMBERED 14 AND 15. 
The court below was presented with two jury instructions regarding proximate cause 
in the plaintiffs proposed jury instructions. These instructions were identified as Plaintiffs 
Proposed Jury Instructions Nos. 14 and 15. (See Supplemental Record, pp. 17 and 18). 
The proposed instructions read as follows: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 14 
When I use the expression "proximate case," I mean a cause which, in 
natural or probable sequence, produced the damage complained of'. It need 
not be the only cause. It is sufficient if it is a substantial factor concurring 
with some other cause acting at the same time, which in combination with it, 
causes the damage. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 15 
A cause can be a substantial contributing cause even though the injury, 
damage or loss would likely have occurred anyway without that contributing 
cause. A substantial cause need not be the sole factor, or even the primary 
factor in causing the plaintiffs injuries, but merely a substantial factor therein. 
The court refused these instructions and instructed the jury on proximate cause through its 
instruction numbered 21. (See Supplemental Record, p. 62). The standard regarding an 
erroneous jury instruction is stated as follows: An erroneous instruction is prejudicial and 
thus constitutes reversible error when it could have affected or did affect the outcome of the 
Garcia v. Windlev, 144 Idaho 539, 164 P3d 819, 823 (Idaho 2007) (emphasis supplied). 
It is understood that the appellant has the burden to clearly show prejudicial error from an 
erroneous jury instruction. Id. 
The instructions tendered to the court by the plaintiff in instructions numbered 14 and 
15 are identical to those that were presented to the high court in the case of Newberm v. 
Martens, 142 Idaho 284, 127 P.3d 187 (Idaho 2005). 
While the first paragraph of the Court's Instruction No. 21 is a mirror of the Plaintiffs 
Proposed Jury Instruction No. 14, the second paragraph of the Court's Instruction No. 21 is 
confusing and deviates from the definition of "substantial cause." The plaintiffs proposed 
instructions Nos. 14 and 15, are complimentary and internally consistent. The second 
paragraph of the Court's Instruction No. 21 does not bring to the jury's attention the further 
definitional attributes found in Plaintiffs Proposed Instruction No. 15, especially in regard to 
a working definition of a substantial contributing cause. In Plaintiffs Proposed Instruction 
No. 15, it is made clear that a cause can be a substantial contributing cause even though the 
injury, damage or loss would likely occurred anyway without that "contributing cause." 
Likewise, it states that a substantial cause need not be the sole factor, or even the primary 
factor but merely a substantial factor. 
The court's attempt at defining a substantial factor rather than cause is confusing and 
misleading as to "one or more proximate causes of an injury", and then defining the conduct 
of two or more persons or entities contributing concurrently as substantial "factors" in 
bringing about an injury. The court's instruction ignores the legal determination that a 
"cause" can be a substantial and contributing factor even though the injury damage or loss 
would have occurred anyway, and that a substantial cause need not be sole factor or even the 
primary factor in the causation. 
These distinctions are especially critical in the instant case where Kay in her 
testimony to the jury stated that her fall would have occurred anyway due to the 
characteristics of the rug and of the tile floor, but that the "severity" of the fall was increased 
based upon the recessed shower area. (Tr., page 192,ll. 4-10). This becomes important when 
one considers the discussion in Newberrv v. Martens regarding the difference between the 
cause of an accident and the causes of an injury. This distinction is important in the instant 
case for the reasons explained by Kay in her testimony to the court. The causes of the fall 
were the rug which did not have a non-slip backing which was placed on a slippery tile floor 
and the lack of an edge protector, (or a wall or door). Contributing also were the fact of the 
fibers of the rug as described by Matthew Mecham that would easily entangle themselves 
around a heel and snag items of clothing. There was no substantive evidence presented to the 
jury that indicated that Kay did anything wrong in her encounter with the bathroom 
configuration, the rug and the shower. There was, as already stated, significant testimony 
and evidence presented to the court that the severity of the injuries sustained by Kay were 
increased by the fact of the recessed shower and the lack of an edge protector. (See Tr., p. 
53, 11. 2-19; Tr., 60, 11. 17-24). 
The point or import of the court's given instruction, with the emphasis that is placed 
in the second paragraph of the court's instruction, would lead to confusion on the part of the 
jury in trying to interpret the meaning of Instruction No. 21 when dealing with multiple 
causes of an injury as opposed to multiple persons contributing to the causation of the 
injury. It is respectfully submitted by the appellant that she has met her burden in this 
matter by demonstrating that the proximate cause instruction issued by the court as 
Instruction No. 21 (Supplemental Record, p. 62) falls into the category of jury instructions 
that could have affected the outcome of the trial. Garcia v. Windlev, 144 Idaho 539, 164 
P.3d 819 (Idaho 2007). 
D. THE JURY VERDICT WAS NOT CONSISTENT WITH APPLICABLE LAW 
NOR SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE. 
A review of the trial transcript as reviewed herein, and of the record herein, indicates 
24 
that plaintiff met her burden of proof in the instant matter. An application of Idaho law to 
the facts of the instant case leaves no doubt that the defendants should have been found 
liable for their failure to warn the plaintiff of the dangerous condition of the bathroom and 
of the rug in the hathroom. The defendants knew, or should have known, of the condition as 
Kay did not, and the defendants, based upon their experience in the house, and of at least 
one previous fall, was charged with the knowledge of the peril to the plaintiff if she used the 
hathroom as she was directed by one of the defendants. The evidence is conclusive that if 
the defendants did not know of the dangerous condition of the bathroom, they should have 
known of the dangerous condition and in the exercise of reasonable care, should have 
warned Kay of the condition and the risks involved or should have made the conditions safe 
by the removal of the rug or providing a non-slip backing to the rug. As an alternative, the 
defendants could have fixed the condition with an easily obtainable remedy that could have 
been achieved by the expenditure of $500.00 as explained by Mr. Mecham. (See, e.g., 
Holzheimer v. Johannesen, 125 Idaho 397,871 P.2d 814 (Idaho 1994); Springer v. Pearson, 
96 Idaho 477,531 P.2d 567 (Idaho 1975); Moonev v. Robinson, 93 Idaho 676,471 P.2d 63 
(Idaho 1970); Evans v. Park, 112 Idaho 400,732 P.2d 369 (Idaho App. 1987). 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the appellant, Kay Chapman, would respectfully request 
that this court issue an order reversing the verdict entered herein and remanding the matter 
to the lower court for a new trial. In addition, the appellant Kay Chapman would 
respectfully request that: (1) Mr. Mecham be allowed to fully testify as described herein and 
(2) that the court direct that Plaintiffs Proposed Instructions 14, 15, 18,20 and 24 be given 
to the jury in the new trial of this matter. 
d@ 
DATED this 4 day of March, 2008. 
ANDERSON NELSON HALL SMITH 
Marvin M. Smith 
